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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether the ‘Kuznets hypothesis’, that economic growth from low levels 
of GDP per capita is initially associated with an increase in income inequality and later followed 
by a decline in inequality, is supported by evidence for a less-developed country, Indonesia. The 
paper outlines the relevant features of the process of rapid growth and structural change, in 
particular industrialisation since the 1960s. It notes the possible consequences of this process for 
changes in income distribution, and draws on disparate sets of statistical data to trace trends in 
income inequality in Indonesia. The paper concludes that the evidence for Indonesia suggests an 
increase in inequality during the 1970s and a subsequent decrease of inequality until 1997. A 
comparison of the evidence with historical data for the UK and Japan suggests that income 
inequality in Indonesia was relatively low. 
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Growth and Inequality: The Case of Indonesia, 1960-1997 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Is there a trade-off between economic growth and income equality? Our understanding of changes 
in the size distribution of total income owes much to Kuznets’ (1955) argument that, from low 
levels of living, economic growth first increases inequality, before it generates a more even 
distribution of income. The fundamental engine of this process is the fact that the marginal 
productivity of labour tends to be higher in the modern (read: industrial) sectors of the economy, 
which fuels the process of structural change. Each person ‘defecting’ from the traditional (read: 
agricultural) sector will increase inequality, until the majority of workers is employed in the modern 
sector and the marginal productivity of labour starts to even out across economic sectors, thus 
generating greater income equality. 
Extensive debate on the historical consequences of industrialisation for the equality of 
income and wealth in Western countries indicates that, eventually, sustained growth is accompanied 
by greater equality (Lindert 2000) But is the historical experience of Western countries replicated by 
the rapidly developing countries in East Asia, such as Indonesia? Surveys based on data from large 
numbers of countries are not conclusive (e.g. Fields 1994), and the relevance of country case studies 
has been emphasised (e.g. Kanbur 2000). The literature on long-term changes in income distribution 
in Indonesia is thin. Relevant publications are restricted to relatively short-term changes (e.g. 
Yoneda 1985, Skoufias 2001), focus on measurement technicalities (e.g. Asra 2000), or primarily 
analyse changes in rates of poverty incidence (e.g. Tjondronegoro et al. 1996). In addition, they all 
take household expenditure data from Indonesia’s National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) for 
granted, without due recognition of the shortcomings.  
This paper provides an inventory of the available evidence of changes in the distribution of 
income in Indonesia as a consequence of rapid and sustained industrialisation during almost three 
decades. The gap in income and wealth between rich and poor is widely said to have increased. In 
part, this perception fuelled the violence that engulfed the country prior to the parliamentary 
elections in May 1997, and contributed to the large-scale disorder in May 1998 preceding the 
abdication of former President Soeharto.  
 The paper will first outline the relevant features of the process of rapid growth and 
structural change, in particular industrialisation since the 1960s. Section 3 will assess the possible 
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consequences of this process for changes in income distribution. Section 4 then discusses the 
strengths and shortcomings of disparate sets of statistical data available to trace trends in income 
inequality in Indonesia, and draws inferences from these data. Section 5 compares the evidence 
with historical data for Japan and the UK. 
 
2. Industrialisation and rapid growth 
 
During the 1950s, employment in manufacturing industry increased in Indonesia, especially in the 
densely populated core island of Java, as a consequence of import-replacing industrial policies. 
However, the share of manufacturing output in GDP and the share of industrial employment 
remained at a lowly 10 percent. High post-war population growth and increasing economic 
mismanagement in the late-1950s and early 1960s stalled the momentum of industrialisation. 
Consequently, Indonesia’s GDP per capita stagnated at around US$70 during the 1960s. Annual 
growth of real GDP was 3.2 percent during 1951-1967, while population growth was 2.0 percent 
per year. 
 A turning point was 1966, when the later President Soeharto came to power and installed a 
new government whose first priority was economic stabilisation and reconstruction.1 Growth of 
real GDP accelerated to an annual average of 7.1 percent during 1968-1997, considerably higher 
than population growth of 2.1 percent per year. The process of economic recovery after 1967 was 
bolstered, rather than triggered by the rapid growth of petroleum exports. Oil production increased 
after the introduction of production-sharing contracts ended a period of uncertainty about the 
position of foreign petroleum companies in Indonesia. Production tripled after 1966, and stabilised 
after 1973 at 500 to 600 barrels per year. Most of it was exported. After 1973, the oil boom was 
carried by the hike of international oil prices, and later by an extension of energy exports to natural 
gas. 
 Indonesia was not a major petroleum producer in the world, but the growth of oil revenues 
made a considerable difference to its underdeveloped economy. Table 1 shows that revenues from 
oil and gas exports came to dominate total exports in the 1970s. Production sharing contracts made 
the state-owned company Pertamina the country’s main petroleum exporter after 1966. Pertamina’s 
net profits and the taxes paid by the oil companies boosted the government’s coffers. Together 
                                                 
1. Hill (1996) provides an extensive review of Indonesia’s economic development since 1966. 
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with foreign aid, oil revenues facilitated a dramatic expansion of public outlay. The government was 
no longer tightly constrained by its budget, while improved export performance enhanced access to 
overseas funding. Both allowed the pursuit of ambitious but pragmatic development plans, which 
initially emphasised the rehabilitation and expansion of infrastructure. Public expenditure rose from 
an average of 10 percent of GDP per year during the 1960s to 20 percent during the 1970s and 23 
percent during the 1980s.  
 The government maintained fiscal prudence by making foreign aid the closing item of the 
budget, thus avoiding budget deficits. The ‘balanced budget’ principle also largely underlies the fact 
that the rate of inflation remained manageable at around 10 percent per year. Controlled inflation 
and rapidly improving foreign exchange earnings eased foreign exchange policies. The rupiah was 
devalued soon after 1966, the system of multiple exchange rates was effectively abandoned, and in 
1971 Indonesia returned to full convertibility, with the rupiah pegged to the US dollar. 
 A large part of government expenditure was directed at the development of infrastructure 
and educational facilities in rural areas, and at agricultural development. Improvement of transport 
and irrigation facilities, investment in the development and dissemination of superior rice varieties 
and cheap chemical fertilisers, and protection of rice farmers from erratic price fluctuations in the 
international rice market, have been the main ingredients in the rapid growth of agricultural 
production. From being one of the biggest rice importers in the world in the 1960s, Indonesia 
achieved rice self-sufficiency in 1985 in the face of rapidly growing domestic demand for rice. This 
Green Revolution was important in absorbing the effects of the fall of oil prices during the 1980s. 
For instance, unlike other oil-exporting less-developed countries, Indonesia did not have to reserve 
export earnings for grain imports when revenues from oil exports decreased 
 Despite rapid economic growth, structural change was sluggish. Figure 1 shows that the 
share of agriculture in non-mining GDP fell consistently. However, the shares of both the industry 
and services sectors increased by around 15 percentage points during 1965-1985. Table 2 indicates 
that labour absorption in services was more prominent than in industry. The main reason is that the 
government initially chose to continue an inward-looking industrialisation policy, which relied on 
large-scale and capital-intensive ventures nurtured with protective tariffs. This policy tended to 
strengthen the position of financially unaccountable state enterprises. Tight market regulations, 
required to foster these industries, resulted in a significant degree of collusion between 
administrators and private enterprise and the extension of privileges to well-connected and 
favoured business groups. Rent seeking indeed generated inefficiencies that impinged on the 
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growth performance. But during the 1970s growth was so robust that this drawback hardly 
registered. 
 The fall of the oil price in the early 1980s, especially in 1986, was a new turning point. 
Economic growth initially slowed down when international petroleum prices decreased, the 
country’s external terms of trade fell by one-third, and export earnings declined. The government 
reacted aptly with a series of structural adjustment policies. In response to falling public revenues 
reduced real public service salaries decreased and shelved development projects, resulting in a 
drastic reduction of public expenditure. Comprehensive tax reforms followed, inducing a diversifi-
cation of public revenues away from oil, towards value-added, property and income taxes. 
Devaluations of the rupiah of close to 30 percent in 1983 and 1986 made non-oil exports more 
competitive. The government also addressed over-regulation, monopolies and protection in a range 
of sectors, and started to eradicate the inefficiencies in resource allocation generated during the 
years of inward-looking industrialisation. 
 Economic deregulation encouraged private investment. Total gross capital formation rose 
from 19 percent of total GDP during the 1970s to 26 percent during the 1980s, after which it 
stabilised at an average of 27 percent in the early 1990s. Most investment was financed 
domestically, although the flow of net direct foreign investment increased from an annual average 
of US$200 million during the 1970s to US$325 million during the 1980s and US$2.6 billion in the 
1990s. Until 1998, Indonesia benefited from the relocation of companies from Japan and later from 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea during the 1980s. Much of this investment found 
its way into industries in which Indonesia had a natural advantage (mining and logging in the Outer 
Islands) or a comparative advantage (a range of labour-intensive industries, mostly in densely 
populated Java). The consequence has been a striking increase in the growth of manufacturing 
output, with an increasingly prominent role for a range of labour-intensive manufactures, such as 
textiles, footwear, apparel, and consumer electronics in exports. Moreover, as Table 2 indicates, 
labour absorption in the industrial sector has since increased, and, as Figure 1 shows, industrial 
growth was such that the share of industry in non-mining GDP exceeded that of agriculture after 
1988. 
 
3. Possible consequences of rapid growth for income distribution 
 
Indonesia’s process of structural transformation was not merely caused by the gradual development 
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of a largely autonomous economy driven by only two engines of change: population growth 
(particularly demographic transition and population movements within Indonesia), and broad 
changes in labour markets (as far as can be ascertained) as a function of product-demand shifts. It 
was also subject to incentives provided by the international economy and to economic policies 
pursued by the Indonesian government. The dramatic shocks of rising and falling energy prices, 
and of structural adjustment in the mid-1980s must have affected different groups of income 
earners in dissimilar ways. The impacts of international economy and government policy 
complicate a straightforward interpretation of changes in income distribution in Indonesia in at 
least six ways. 
 (1) The dramatic impact of oil and gas on export revenues initially bolstered the value of 
the rupiah and impeded the development of other export-oriented economic sectors on the basis 
of Java’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive products, such as manufactures. This was one 
reason, until the mid-1980s, for the import-replacing stance of industrial policy, and for the focus 
of industrialisation on heavy, capital-intensive industries, often run by public enterprises and 
situated in urban areas.2 There may thus have been a (labour-saving) bias in technological change in 
manufacturing at a time when the labour force was growing rapidly. Moreover, the demand for 
labour in manufacturing largely concerned skilled labour, which was in short supply. Consequently, 
the skill premium and differences in wage rates between manufacturing and the rest of the 
economy may have increased in the 1970s. 
 (2) Oil revenues boosted public revenue to the extent that the government could drastically 
increase discretionary public expenditure. As mentioned above, considerable amounts were spent 
on, for instance, educational facilities and support of the agricultural sector in the form of input 
subsidies, particularly in rice agriculture. Increased public outlay on education may have started to 
reduce the skill premium in the labour market in the 1980s, even though the effort to improve 
educational facilities was mainly directed towards an across-the-board upgrading of primary and 
lower secondary education.  
 Support for the agricultural sector had possibly greater immediate consequences for the 
process of structural change. There is ample evidence that public expenditure on agricultural 
development promoted agricultural labour productivity, which may have increased rural wage rates 
and stemmed the flow of people from rural areas to urban centres in search of work. However, the 
                                                 
2. Another reason is that previous inward looking and state-dominated economic policies had nurtured a complex of 
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Green Revolution primarily benefited rice farmers in the well-irrigated areas of Java and some parts 
of the Outer Islands, and caused a relative neglect of producers of non-rice crops outside such 
areas. Still, most new entrants into the labour market were absorbed during the 1970s and 1980s in 
the agricultural sector, perhaps no longer primarily in rice agriculture but increasingly in the 
production of a more diverse range of agricultural commodities. Given the scarcity of agricultural 
land in Java, the agricultural employment that these policies helped to create largely took the form 
of wage labour and tenant farming, rather than an expansion of new owner-operated farms. This 
may have advantaged rural landowners, while the creation of additional employment in agriculture 
may have decreased the inequality in wage income relative to manufacturing. 
 (3) Most discretionary public investment was for infrastructure development. This is 
important, considering that the islands of the Indonesian archipelago had historically very different 
degrees of exchange with the wider national and international economy, which was in part due to 
the lack of transport facilities. It is therefore not possible to assume that the country has had fully 
integrated factor and product markets. Despite massive public investment for infrastructure 
development throughout the country, communications facilities are still underdeveloped compared 
to the core island of Java in most of the islands outside Java, perhaps with the exception of Bali and 
parts of Sumatra. Underdeveloped communications can be expected to impede the mobility of 
production factors and products and thus enhance income inequality, particularly between Java and 
the rest of the country. 
 (4) The expansion of economic activity since the mid-1980s was largely driven by 
investment in industries in which Indonesia had a natural or comparative advantage. Capital-
intensive mining and logging operations were mainly established in remote and underpopulated 
areas in the islands outside Java, where they tended to generate employment in enclaves. Labour-
intensive industries have mainly been established in densely populated Java, particularly in urban 
centres like Jakarta, Bogor, Surabaya and Bandung, to a lesser extent in cities outside Java, such as 
Medan (North Sumatra) and Batam, Singapore’s satellite in Indonesia. Since the mid-1980s, the 
creation of additional low-wage employment in manufacturing industry may have depressed 
average wages relative to non-manufacturing employment and may thus have decreased income 
inequality. On the other hand, we may expect it to have exacerbated income inequality between (a) 
urban and rural Indonesia, (b) Java and the rest of the country.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
vested interests in bureaucracy and society, which any government would have found very difficult to tackle head-on. 
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 (5) The Indonesian government enforced minimum wage legislation in 1988, which in 
effect only affected large-scale, incorporated ventures. The legislation could not directly influence 
wage rates of employees in the informal sector or self-employed workers. The legislation created a 
two-tier labour market. Still, the impact of the legislation may have been limited. One reason is that 
minimum wages were initially set at levels well below current wage rates in manufacturing 
industries. They were significantly increased in 1993, but this took place at a time when the entire 
labour market started to tighten as a consequence of falling population growth and a sustained rate 
of employment creation (Manning and Jayasuriya 1996: 36-38).  
 (6) Over time, employment in agriculture in terms of hours worked may have increased less 
than employment in terms of workers. Those who were primarily employed in agricultural pursuits 
may therefore increasingly have combined this with a range of off-farm jobs, including part-time 
employment in small-scale manufacturing. This could be a major reason why the ratio of Gross 
Value Added (GVA) per worker outside agriculture and GVA per worker in agriculture increased 
from an average of 1.7 during the 1960s, to 2.1 during the 1970s, 2.8 during the 1980s and 3.8 
during 1990-97.3 The increasing ratio suggests that the forces ‘pulling’ labour out of the agricultural 
sector were substantial. It also reflects the growing differences in capital intensity of production 
between agriculture and industry. This ratio does not take account of the mitigating impact of off-
farm employment that augments the income of farm households from agricultural production 
(Rietveld 1986; Collier et al. 1996).4 
 Other factors are relevant to an interpretation of statistical evidence on changes in income 
inequality. For instance, Indonesia was most likely not immune to the historically irreversible shift 
in the functional distribution of income from landed capital to human capital. Given that the last is 
generally more evenly distributed than land, we would, ceteris paribus, expect a long-term trend 
towards greater equality for this reason alone. Because the human capital tends to be employed 
outside the agricultural sector, possibly outside the rural areas, it is possible to expect an increasing 
inequality between urban and rural wages. In addition, knowing that non-agricultural employment 
is mainly created in Java, we would expect increasing inequality between Java and the rest of the 
                                                 
3. Calculated with interpolated data on employment from the population censuses (see Table 2), and GVA in 
agriculture and in the non-mining sectors of the economy at current prices for 1960-1997 from the national accounts 
(see Figure 1). 
4. The 1995 inter-census population survey revealed that 64 percent of agricultural households in Indonesia had 
mixed incomes, while 35 percent earned most of their income from non-agricultural pursuits. In Java, even 90 percent 
of agricultural households had mixed incomes, while 51 percent earned most of their income outside agricultural sector. 
Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Survei Penduduk antar Sensus 1995, Seri S2. (Jakarta: BPS, 1996) Table 59.3.  
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country. Other factors that should ideally be considered in relation to trends in income inequality 
are: long-term changes in e.g. average skills per member of the labour force, labour-market 
institutions (including the limited role of unions, but mainly minimum wage legislation), and the 
impact of government fiscal redistribution (through taxes and subsidies). However, little is known 
about the impact of each throughout the period under observation.5 
 
4. Analysing the available data 
 
It is widely acknowledged that all groups in Indonesian society have benefited from the rapid 
economic growth. Rates of poverty incidence have fallen dramatically (Booth 1993). Still, it is 
widely believed that the overall distribution of income and wealth in Indonesia became increasingly 
uneven. This perception is to some extent based on hearsay and on subjective impressions of the 
blatant contrasts between the opulent lifestyles of the urban rich and the modest lives of the rural 
poor. It is also sustained by concerns about the prominence of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian 
business. Some estimates put this minority group, or rather the conglomerates controlled by ethnic 
Chinese businessmen, in charge of 70 tor 75 percent of ‘the economy’. Such estimates were based 
on the market capitalisation of companies listed on the Jakarta stock exchange (Backman 1995: 40-
41). The majority of such companies may indeed have been affiliated with ethnic Chinese business 
tycoons, but such calculations do not take account of the actual ownership of the shares of these 
companies. They also do not take account of the value of productive assets used in non-listed 
ventures. Worse, such calculations confused stock values with income flows. Other estimates 
suggested that the sales of Chinese-owned listed companies generated 50 percent of GDP (The 
Economist, 9 March 1996). Such an estimate failed to distinguish between gross value and value-
added of production. 
 A complication in assessing these claims is that there are no statistical data on the size 
distribution of income.6 Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) does not generate such data. 
A major reason is that it does not employ the income approach to approximate national income, 
but only the output and expenditure approaches. An additional reason is that an important data 
                                                 
5. Only the Social Accounting Matrices (see below) provide some indications for benchmark years of the impact of 
taxation and subsidies on income distribution across 10 main socio-economic categories. 
6. Data in the World Development Report profess to indicate the size distribution of income in Indonesia. In fact, these 
are processed estimates of the distribution of household expenditure, which are by definition biased towards equality 
(see below).  
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source, the income tax, still extends to less than 5 percent of all income earners in the labour force, 
or less than 10 percent of all wage earners. There are also few provisions to estimate forms of 
income other than wages and salaries liable to income tax. This paper will make do with available 
data sets.  
 
a. Changes in the size distribution of household expenditure 
 
The first national household budget survey was conducted as part of the National Socio-Economic 
Survey (Susenas) in 1964/65. These surveys have been repeated regularly with ever growing samples 
of households (from 21,300 in 1964/65 to 65,000 in 1993). However, their aim was to record 
household expenditure. Only since 1978 do they include income data, albeit that these remained 
unpublished.7 The surveys are believed to be biased towards the urban poor. They underestimate 
household expenditure on food (Surbakti 1995: 61). Non-food expenditure is also underestimated, 
particularly spending on durables such as televisions and cars. Such factors create a progressively 
increasing degree of underestimation the higher household expenditure is.8 
 Table 3 shows that the Gini ratios of household expenditure throughout Indonesia have 
been quite low, except for 1978. The 1978 peak was largely due to a surge in uneven distribution in 
urban Indonesia, more particularly in Java. The distribution of total expenditure only reveals a 
significant trend towards greater equality in rural Indonesia since 1978, more particularly in the 
Outer Islands. In both rural Indonesia and the Outer Islands inequality has indeed become 
remarkably lower than in urban Indonesia, particularly in Java. This differentiation has emerged 
from a situation in the 1960s of comparable inequality between urban and rural Indonesia, and 
between Java and the Outer Islands.  
 The peak in 1978 may have been a consequence of the policy of import-replacing 
industrialisation that mainly created gainful employment in urban Java for skilled workers, as 
mentioned above. This situation was compounded by the rapid development of other sectors, 
particularly in urban areas, such as the public sector, which also sought to engage highly qualified 
                                                 
7. Some authors have been able to use these unpublished data to estimate income inequality, see Figure 2.  
8. The estimation of expenditure on consumer durables relies on the memory of the head of the households 
regarding spending during the year prior to the survey. For whatever reasons, low-income households tend to be less 
‘forgetful’ than high-income households. On the whole, the degree of underestimation is aptly illustrated by the fact that 
there has long been a substantial discrepancy between total household expenditure, estimated through Susenas, and total 
private consumption in the Indonesian national accounts, estimated as a residual after other main items of expenditure 
on GDP were accounted for. (Hill 1996: 195) 
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workers and put further pressure on the skill premium.  
 It seems that the situation abated, resulting in a significant decrease in inequality in rural 
expenditure, as a consequence of the government’s commitment to the Green Revolution and 
massive public investment in rural development. This enhanced the incomes of small rice farmers, 
and dampened the impact on income distribution of the growth of urban and non-agricultural 
employment. The fact that the Green Revolution technology had few economies of scale meant 
that most farmers benefited, which contributed to maintaining equality in rural areas. Moreover, the 
labour-absorbing nature of the technology created new employment in rural areas, which also 
furthered equality. 
 Improvements in average educational attainment are likely to have spurred the decrease in 
overall inequality in the early 1980s. In the mid-1980s, industry policy changed to an export-
oriented stance, which greatly enhanced the expansion of gainful urban employment and kept the 
inequality of household expenditure at level in urban areas, as Table 3 suggests. 
 
b. Changes in the size distribution of wage income 
 
A second source of data on income distribution is the National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas), 
conducted during 1976-78, once estimated on the basis of Susenas returns in 1982, and annually 
again during 1986-1997. Except for 1976, the data were obtained with four quarterly surveys, each 
involving samples of 20,000-25,000 households, which have been extrapolated with population 
census data. Sakernas only collected data on wage income. Its income data are therefore restricted 
to wage labourers and employees, who constituted approximately 28 percent of the labour force in 
1986 and 35% in 1997. The data fail to take account of changes in income of the majority of 
income earners, mostly self-employed in the agricultural sector.9 
 Table 4 shows that the Gini ratios calculated from wage income data were significantly 
higher than the expenditure data in Table 3, which is to be expected. Table 4 does reveal some 
similarities with Table 3. One is the relatively high degree of across-the-board inequality in the late-
1970s, particularly 1978. Inequality decreased, remained relatively constant during 1986-1990, but 
fell significantly during the 1990s, albeit with a minor outlier in 1993 due to the rise of minimum 
                                                 
9. An additional problem with the Sakernas data is that the Gini ratios calculated from the published data have 
become increasingly sensitive to the average which has to be assumed for the highest income bracket with monthly 
incomes of Rp.300,000 and more. For that reason, Table 4 contains sections A and B, which present Gini ratios based 
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wages affecting a section of the wage labourers. The table confirms the differences in inequality 
between Java and the Outer Islands in the last two columns. They indicate that the overall trend 
appears to be driven by changes in Java. Table 4 does not show the same differences in inequality 
between urban and rural areas as Table 3. In fact, inequality among wage earners in urban 
Indonesia is generally lower than in rural Indonesia.  
 Table 4 provides additional information on the degree of inequality in and across three 
main economic sectors. It should be noted that inequality among all wage earners is consistently 
higher than inequality within each sector, which indicates significant inequality across the three 
sectors. In the late-1970s and in 1982 inequality was higher in the non-agricultural sectors, 
compared to agriculture, but since 1986 the degree of inequality among wage earners in the non-
agricultural sectors has fallen considerably, well below inequality in agriculture, which stagnated. In 
conclusion, the fall in inequality among non-agricultural wage earners, particularly in urban Java, 
appears to have driven the overall trend towards greater equality among wage earners in Indonesia 
since the late 1970s, for reasons noted above. 
 
c. Changes in the regional distribution of GDP 
 
Indonesia’s economic history during the first half of the 20th century was characterised by two 
countervailing processes. One was an increasing reliance of the economy on exports generated in 
the Outer Islands. The other was a process of administrative and political centralisation, radiating 
from the core island of Java. The first trend continued after full independence in 1949 to the extent 
that in 1955 88 percent of exports, in particular rubber, palm oil and petroleum, originated from the 
Outer Islands. At the time, Indonesia’s foreign exchange policies effectively imposed an additional 
tax on exports, and export producers in the Outer Islands no longer received international market 
prices for their produce. Moreover, goods increasingly had to be shipped through ports in Java, 
which added handling costs. Such centralising tendencies of Jakarta enhanced allegations that 
import-consuming Java was ‘milking’ the export-producing Outer Islands, and contributed to the 
regional secessionist uprisings during 1956-58. These rebellions were subdued with military force 
and have not been allowed to re-surface until 1999. Still, the extent to which the provinces in the 
Outer Islands generated foreign exchange and revenues for the national government increased with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on different assumed averages. 
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the growth of natural resource based industries such as petroleum, natural gas, mining and logging. 
 Provincial GDP data since the late 1960s have consistently indicated very significant 
differences in GDP per capita between the provinces which are well endowed with natural 
resources and those which are densely populated and/or sparsely endowed with natural resources 
(Hill 1991/92). Table 5 provides some indications of the considerable regional economic 
differences in Indonesia, with East and West Nusatenggara at the lower end of the scale, while the 
spin-off from oil production placed East Kalimantan at the higher end.10  
 Table 5 reveals significant regional dynamics. Especially the economies of Riau, South 
Sumatra, Maluku, Bengkulu, North Sulawesi, Jambi and Southeast Sulawesi have seen a consistent 
decline relative to the national average, while West Papua, Bali, West Sumatra, and most provinces 
in Java experienced an improvement relative to the national average. The Gini ratio and the 
weighted coefficient of variation both indicate that the inequality of regional GDP has slightly 
increased over time, even though the degree of inequality was still low in 1997. A telling statistic is 
that the ratio of GDP per capita in the poorest and the richest provinces increased from 5.1 in 1971 
to 9.8 in 1997. 
 This evidence may confirm Williamson’s (1965) thesis, which suggests that during a process 
of economic development the spatial distribution of economic activity first concentrates and then 
disperses, thus causing the inequality of regional income distribution to first increase, due to the 
disequilibrating effects of factor mobility. This is congruous with the fact that the degree of 
infrastructure development in the Outer Islands still lags behind Java. The Williamson thesis 
predicts that inequality will decrease at a later stage, as equalising forces of factor mobility take 
effect.  
 The GDP data in Table 5 exclude value added in oil and gas production, which significantly 
reduces GDP in the provinces of Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and West Papua. The central 
government benefits most from the revenues these activities generate. It redistributes them in a way 
that bolsters the poorer provinces, particularly those in Java. The fact that public revenues have in 
recent decades been channelled into the development of manufacturing industry in Java has 
articulated the economic dichotomy between Java and the Outer Islands, and has prolonged the 
existence of the significant interregional inequalities in non-mining GDP per capita (Akita and 
Lukman 1995). 
                                                 
10. The ranking is broadly congruent with ranking on the basis of provincial household expenditure data from Susenas, 
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 Public pronouncements have favoured budgetary decentralisation, but actions have been 
cautious. Local governments still have little tax autonomy and centrally established priorities 
constrain funding from the central government (Ranis and Stewart 1994). In the early 1990s more 
than 75 percent of the budgets of most provincial governments, plus many projects implemented 
directly from the centre and many others channelled through district and village governments, were 
still funded by the central government.11  
 
d. Changes in access to land 
 
Whether income inequality in a country can be expected to abate depends to a large extent on the 
conditions at the starting point, when land and labour are the main sources of income. A skewed 
pattern of land ownership would generate a skewed income pattern, which only abates when 
income from capital (including human capital) starts to play a greater role. In the 1950s it was 
widely believed that access to land in Indonesia was uneven and that a redistribution of agricultural 
land would be a key to a more even distribution of income and to greater prosperity, particularly in 
Java. Land reforms were implemented in Indonesia during the troubled 1960s, but not much land 
was actually redistributed. This was not primarily because of obstruction by landlords, but mainly 
because there was simply little land to redistribute in Java in an effort to address the extensive 
poverty problems. Table 6 indicates that the average farm size was only 0.7 ha in Java, compared to 
1.7 ha in the Outer Islands.  
 Controversy about skewed access to land flared up in the 1970s, when it was widely 
believed that the Green Revolution in rice agriculture primarily benefited large farmers. It seemed 
that they bought up smaller farms to achieve consolidation of farms, and would use labour-
replacing technology, thus exacerbating landlessness, particularly in rural Java. Landlessness indeed 
increased, but not because of the consolidation of farms. In fact, Table 6 shows that the number of 
farms increased in Java from 8 million in 1963 to more than 10 million in 1993 and the average 
farm size decreased from 0.7 to less than 0.6 ha, while the Gini ratio remained relatively constant.12 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
even after correction for price differences across provinces. See e.g. Islam and Khan (1986), who used 1976 Susenas data. 
11. In April 1995 the Indonesian government proclaimed a policy aimed at increasing regional autonomy, in order to 
achieve decentralisation of public administration. The law was approved by parliament in 2000. However, the 
consequences of this policy stance still have to materialise. 
12. Unfortunately the results for 1993 are questionable. They indicate a decrease in the average size of farms in Java 
due to the dramatic decrease of total farmland in Java relative to 1983, and a slight decrease in the Outer Islands. 
Moreover, the 1993 totals of arable land are a lot lower than the land use data according to Luas Tanah/Lahan menurut 
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In the Outer Islands there has been a significant trend towards greater equality during 1963-1993, 
with the Gini ratio decreasing to levels comparable to Java. The total number of farms more than 
doubled, and average farm size decreased from 1.7 to 1.2 ha.  
 There were no dramatic changes in tenant farming. In Java the share of farms renting all 
the land they operated was 6.4% in 1963, 9.5% in 1983 and 7.1% in 1993, while the share of those 
renting part of their land was 34.6% in 1963, 34.2% in 1983 and 30.4% in 1993. (Van der Eng 
1996: 150) These shares were all much lower in the Outer Islands, where a situation of land 
abundance prevailed in most areas. Hence, on the whole, the degree of tenant farming in Indonesia 
has been moderate in both historical and international perspective. 
 Table 6 suggests that a continuous subdivision of farms has taken place in Java, with 
operators of small plots holding on to their land, rather than selling out to colleagues operating 
larger farms. This process was possibly furthered by the continued growth of input subsidies, 
mentioned above. Even though access to land has not become more uneven, Java’s agricultural 
sector has clearly not been able to absorb all of the increase of the labour force. Consequently, the 
group of rural landless has grown significantly. Many of them became rural wage labourers, but 
many others must have become self-employed workers. To take account of their plight additional 
data are required, which are not readily available. 
 
e. Changes in the socio-economic distribution of income 
 
One way to understand the plight of the rural landless, as far as their incomes are concerned, is 
through a System of Socio-Economic Accounts (generally known as a Social Accounting Matrix, 
SAM). They reconcile frequently conflicting data collections within a consistent framework and 
extend the System of National Accounts by and accounting for the distribution of income across 
major socio-economic groups.13 In Indonesia, the compilation of the SAM implied a reconciliation 
of underestimated consumption data from Susenas with data from the I-O Tables. The results of the 
population and agricultural censuses, and the Sakernas data were used to achieve a further 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Penggunaannya di Jawa/di Luar Jawa (BPS), which suggest 8.2 million ha of farm land in Java and 17.2 million ha in the 
Outer Islands.  
13. Indonesia’s SAMs diverge for that reason from the SAMs generated for OECD countries. For an explanation of 
Indonesia’s 1980 SAM, see Thorbecke and Van der Pluijm (1993: 139-162) or Keuning and Thorbecke (1993). The 
published data of the 1980 SAM are much more elaborate than the data published in the source used for Table 7, which 
is why it is not possible to provide more details, such as distribution of income across sectors of employment for all 5 
years.  
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distribution.  
 The construction of the SAMs involved a detailed break down of total value added (at 
market prices) from the I-O Tables into five groups of factor income: (1) paid labour income, (2) 
an imputed value of the labour of self-employed and household workers to estimate unpaid labour 
income, (3) unincorporated capital income (including remuneration to owners of agricultural land), 
(4) private domestic and government corporate capital income, and (5) foreign corporate income. 
Factor income was then allocated as total household income before direct taxes to the 10 types of 
households in Table 7.14 The SAMs therefore take account of total income, not just wages.  
 Table 7 reveals the impact of Indonesia’s structural adjustment policies during the 1980s on 
different socio-economic groups. It shows changes between and within the three main groups of 
income earners (agriculture, non-agricultural rural and urban). During the 18 years, the population 
increased by 57 million people. Half of this increase was absorbed by households in gainful 
employment in urban areas, one-quarter each by households in both agricultural and in rural non-
agricultural sectors. Consequently, despite continued growth in the absolute number of people 
depending on income in the agricultural sector, the overall dependence on income from agriculture 
decreased from 60 to 50 percent (which clearly does not take off-farm income into account). Given 
that the share on non-agricultural sectors in the rural areas remained constant, the ‘drop-outs’ from 
the non-agricultural sector were absorbed in urban employment. The share of people depending on 
income from urban employment increased from 17 to 27 percent. 
 Per capita household incomes are expressed as percentages of the overall average, in the 
absence of group-specific deflators for the computation of incomes in constant prices. Hence, all 
per capita incomes may have increased in absolute terms, even though some decreased relative to 
the national average. On the whole, average income in the agricultural sector increased during 
1975-1985, and decreased during 1985-1993, relative to the overall average. Average per capita 
household income in the urban sector declined significantly relative to the overall average.  
 Within the agricultural sector, it is appears that labour absorption took place in the form of 
wage labour and (presumably) the sub-division of small farms. Per capita income of the households 
of agricultural wage labourers fell considerably relative to the overall average during 1985-1993, but 
so did the income of farm households operating more than one hectare. Within the rural non-
agricultural sector, average incomes at the top end fell considerably relative to the overall average, 
                                                 
14. The source also provides estimates of household expenditure, which indicate the burden of direct taxation and the 
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while the income earners at the low end had a mixed experience. On the whole, a significant 
proportion of income earners moved up from low to high socio-economic status. Within the urban 
sector, per capita incomes at both the top and the low end decreased, although more people joined 
the high-income earning households than joined the low-income earners.  
 Table 7 cannot address the issue of general inequality in the size distribution of income. 
However, it does reveal complex and dynamic changes in income distribution during the 18 years 
of rapid economic growth. It does not expose an unequivocal increase in inequality.  
 
5. Historical comparison 
 
Figure 2 shows that, at a similar stage of economic development, the 1930s in Japan and the 1970s 
in Indonesia, inequality in both countries increased significantly, before it started to decline – in 
Japan much faster than in Indonesia. However, in both countries income inequality apparently 
never reached the levels it reached in England at a similar stage of development, i.e. the first half of 
the 19th century.  
 This finding underscores Oshima’s (1994) suggestion that income inequality in Asia 
decreased at earlier stages of development (denoted by real GDP per capita) compared to Western 
countries in a distant past. Oshima suggests that Asian countries could readily obtain production 
technologies internationally, according to their needs as determined by relative factor prices. Figure 
2 suggests that this may have been easier in Indonesia since the 1970s than Japan since the 1930s. 
In contrast, in ‘the West’, such as in England in the early 19th century, such technologies had to be 
developed through painstaking and time-consuming processes, while early steam-powered labour-
replacing technologies proved lumpy and in fact inequality-exacerbating. Likewise, it could be 
argued that access to inequality-reducing education in reaction to an increase in demand for skilled 
and educated workers has been much easier in Asian countries at earlier stages (denoted by real 
GDP per capita) than in Western countries in a distant past. Public subsidies have made education 
increasingly more accessible since the 19th century, even in less-developed countries such as Japan 
in the past and Indonesia more recently.  
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rate of saving for each of the 10 types of households. 
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The available data indicate that the relationship between economic growth, structural change and 
inequality has not been as straightforward in Indonesia during the last 30 years as the Kuznets 
curve suggests. The international economy and different government policies also impacted on the 
development of income distribution. The available data do not support the suggestion that the rich 
have become richer and the poor poorer. The case of Indonesia demonstrates that rapid economic 
growth from low levels of living does not necessarily lead to significant increases in inequality, as 
the Kuznets thesis predicts. Hence, apart from a slight increase in regional inequality supporting the 
Williamson thesis, the data do not support the suggestion that there has been a trade-off between 
growth and equality in Indonesia.  
 The data presented in this paper reveal very dynamic changes in inequality. In particular 
Tables 3 and 4 both suggest that income distribution has become less uneven since the late 1970s. 
The paper has argued that the oil boom may have enhanced income inequality in non-agricultural 
employment in the 1970s. But the effect levelled off, when agricultural policies that used lavish 
input subsidies to support agricultural incomes started to take effect in the late 1970s. This trend 
continued when the government had to respond to lower oil prices during the 1980s. The burden 
of adjustment on the agricultural sector was reduced by exchange rate depreciation, agricultural 
pricing policies, and some diversification away from rice towards more profitable non-rice crops. 
Exchange rate depreciation and a range of measures deregulating large non-agricultural sections of 
the economy encouraged investment in areas sectors where Indonesia had a comparative 
advantage, thus creating gainful employment, particularly in Java. Moreover, the broad stance of 
government policy helped shield the poor from the adverse effects of public expenditure 
reductions. ‘Poverty-related’ expenditure, such as human resource development, was protected 
relative to expenditure that was of less direct benefit to the poor, thus helping to prevent inequality 
from increasing.  
 This paper touched on several relevant issues. The interpretation provided above should be 
put to the test in further research which may bring out the exact factors behind the observed 
changes in inequality, certainly if the premise is that factor markets (particularly the labour market) 
play a central role in the distribution of income. For instance, changes in the skill premium and 
educational attainment, the impact of the demographic transition, and variations in wage rates 
between industry and the rest of the economy, are important topics that should be taken into 
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account.15  
 
                                                 
15. These issues, and others, are discussed in Manning (1998), and need to be associated with the changes in income 
distribution noted in this paper. 
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Table 1: Exports and Government Revenue, Indonesia 1960-1997  
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  Export Revenue Total Government Revenue 
Yearsa ───────────── ────────────────── 
 (mln. % Share (mln. % Share % Share 
 US$) of Oil US$) of Oil of ODA 
  and Gas  and Gas 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
1960-1968 722 35 220 7 4 
1969-1973 1,637 47 1,615 25 24 
1974-1978 9,114 77 8,209 45 18 
1979-1983 21,636 78 18,377 57 14 
1984-1988 18,326 58 18,742 39 20 
1989-1993 29,553 35 27,696 27 18 
1994-1997 47,182 23 31,045 18 15 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
a. Except for 1960-1968, years refer to fiscal years (e.g. 1969 is 1969/70). 
Notes: Annual averages. Oil exports refer to crude oil and oil products. Government revenue 
calculated from fiscal year data with, for 1960-1971, the free market exchange rate of the rupiah, 
rather than the controlled rate to approximate actual purchasing power. Government revenue from 
oil and gas refers to net oil profits and company tax. Overseas development assistance (ODA) 
refers to government-to-government grants and concessional loans. 
Sources: Calculated from Statistik Indonesia; Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 34, No.1 (1998) 
pp.44-45; IMF International Financial Statistics; UN Trade Yearbook; Pick’s Currency Yearbook. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sector Shares in Employment in Indonesia, 1961-1990 (percentages) 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  1961 1971 1980 1990 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
A. Males 
Agriculturea 74.2 66.4 57.2 50.5 
Industryb 7.9 9.3 13.4 17.0 
Services 17.9 24.3 29.4 32.5 
 
B. Females 
Agriculturea 71.2 64.7 54.0 48.9 
Industryb 8.4 11.7 13.2 16.8 
Services 20.4 23.5 32.8 34.3 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
a. Includes fisheries and forestry. 
b. Includes mining and construction. 
Note: The years correspond to population census results. 
Sources: Hugo, G.J. et al., The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development. (Singapore: Oxford UP, 
1987) pp.262-264; Penduduk Indonesia. Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S.2. (Jakarta: BPS, 1992). 
 
 
Table 3: Gini Ratios of Per Capita Household Expenditure in Indonesia, 1964/65-1996 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  Areas (1)    Total  Areas (2)    
 ────────────  ─────────── 
 Urban Rural Java Outer 
    Islands 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
1964/65 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34 
1969/70 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.33 
1976 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32 
1978 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.32 
1980 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.31 
1984 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.31 
1987 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.27 
1990 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.29 
1993 0.33 0.26 0.34 0.35 0.30 
1996 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.30 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Note: Urban areas are defined as communities having a population density greater than 5,000 
people per km², less than 25% of employment in agriculture, and 8 or more ‘urban-related’ 
facilities, such as medical clinics. 
Source: Calculated from Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional: Pengeluaran untuk Konsumsi Penduduk (various 
years). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Inequality among Wage Earners in Indonesia, 1976-1997 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
 Industrial Sectors        Total Areas (1)     Areas (2)   
 ──────────────────  ────────── ───────── 
 Agri- Manufac- Other  Urban Rural Java Outer 
 culture turing      Islands 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
A. Gini Ratios of Earnings among Wage Earnersa 
1976c 0.36 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.41 
1977 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.43 
1978 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.43 
1982 0.33 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.38 
1986 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.36 
1987 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.34 
1988 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.33 
1989 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.34 
1990 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.34 
1991 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.34 
1992 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.34 
1993 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.35 
1994 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.35 
1995 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.36 0.33 
1996 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.31 
1997 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.30 
 
B. Gini Ratios of Earnings among Wage Earnersb 
1990 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.35 
1991 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.36 
1992 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.37 
1993 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.39 
1994 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.39 
1995 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.37 
1996 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.36 
1997 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.35 
 
C. Wage Earners (millions) 
1986 3.5 3.1 10.9 17.5 7.3 10.2 13.0 4.5 
1990 4.9 4.3 11.9 21.1 9.9 11.2 15.7 5.4 
1997 4.8 6.7 19.0 30.5 16.2 14.3 20.8 9.7 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
a. Average in the highest income bracket of over Rp.300,000 per month assumed to be 
Rp.400,000. 
b. Average in the highest income bracket assumed to be Rp.500,000 per month. 
c. September and December only. 
Notes: The procedures used to collect and extrapolate the basic survey data are different for 1976-
78, 1982 and 1986-97. Except for 1976, the data are based on four quarterly surveys. For the 
definition of urban areas, see Table 3. 
 
 
 
Sources: Calculated from Keadaan Angkatan Kerja di Indonesia (1976-78), Keadaan Buruh/Pekerja di 
Indonesia (1982, 1986-88), Keadaan Pekerja/Karyawan di Indonesia (1989-94, 1996-97), Penduduk 
Indonesia: Hasil Survei Penduduk antar Sensus 1995, Seri S2. (1995).  
 
 
 
Table 5: Inequality of Regional GDP per Capita in Indonesia, 1971, 1983 and 1997 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
  1971        1983        1997       
 ────────── ────────── ────────── 
Province National  National  National 
 Av.= 100 Rank Av.= 100 Rank Av.= 100 Rank 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Jakarta 247 (1) 328 (1) 371 (1) 
East Kalimantan 247 (2) 218 (2) 246 (2) 
West Papua 99 (14) 108 (8) 163 (3) 
Riau 139 (6) 116 (6) 135 (4) 
Central Kalimantan 116 (8) 130 (4) 127 (5) 
Bali 107 (11) 98 (11) 122 (6) 
Aceh 96 (15) 119 (5) 107 (7) 
North Sumatra 158 (4) 103 (9) 100 (8) 
South Kalimantan 111 (9) 109 (7) 97 (9) 
West Kalimantan 101 (12) 90 (13) 97 (10) 
East Java 88 (19) 99 (10) 93 (11) 
West Sumatra 89 (18) 97 (12) 91 (12) 
Yogyakarta 75 (22) 75 (21) 89 (13) 
West Java 87 (20) 81 (18) 88 (14) 
South Sumatra 201 (3) 143 (3) 87 (15) 
North Sulawesi 122 (7) 85 (16) 75 (16) 
South Sulawesi 79 (21) 77 (20) 75 (17) 
Central Java 74 (23) 74 (22) 71 (18) 
Maluku 106 (10) 88 (14) 66 (19) 
Jambi 150 (5) 84 (17) 65 (20) 
Bengkulu 91 (17) 86 (15) 59 (21) 
Lampung 92 (16) 57 (24) 55 (22) 
Southeast Sulawesi 99 (13) 81 (19) 54 (23) 
West Nusatenggara 52 (25) 51 (25) 44 (24) 
Central Sulawesi 56 (24) 73 (23) 43 (25) 
East Nusatenggara 48 (26) 48 (27) 40 (27) 
 
Gini ratioa 0.18  0.21  0.24 
CVwb 0.42  0.55  0.66 
Ratio highest/lowest 5.1  6.8  9.8 
───────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
a. Calculated with provincial totals of population and GDPQ, ranked by GDP per capita. The 
implicit assumption is that income is distributed equally within each province.  
b. Coefficient of variation weighted by population. 
Note: GDP excludes Gross Value Added from oil and gas, and is not corrected for price differences 
between provinces. 
Sources: Calculated with population data from Statistik Indonesia, and GDP data from Pendapatan 
Regional Propinsi-Propinsi di Indonesia, 1971-1977. (Jakarta: BPS, 1980), Pendapatan Regional Propinsi-
Propinsi di Indonesia menurut Lapangan Usaha, 1983-1990. (Jakarta: BPS, 1992), Produk Domestik Regional 
Bruto Propinsi-Propinsi di Indonesia menurut Lapangan Usaha, 1993-1997. (Jakarta: BPS, 1998). 
 
 
 
Table 6: Size distribution of operated farms in Indonesia, 1963-1993 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
  1963      1973      1983      1993     
 ──────── ──────── ──────── ──────── 
 Farms Areaa Farms Area Farms Area Farms Areaa 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
Java (percentages): 
0.1 - 0.5 ha 52 19 55 22 54 21 66 32 
0.5 - 1.0 ha 27 25 26 27 27 27 22 29 
1.0 - 2.0 ha 15 28 14 27 14 27 9 21 
2.0 - 3.0 ha 3 12 3 11 3 12 2 8 
    > 3.0 ha 2 16 2 13 2 13 1 10 
 
Average farm size 0.73 ha 0.66 ha 0.67 ha 0.56 ha 
Gini ratio 0.464a 0.471 0.469 0.454a 
Number of farms (millions) 7.95 8.27 9.21 10.57 
Total farm area (million ha) 5.66a 5.47 6.17 4.91a 
 
Outer Islands (percentages): 
0.1 - 1.0 ha 55 16 52 16 44 14 57 24 
1.0 - 2.0 ha 23 19 26 22 29 23 27 31 
2.0 - 3.0 ha 9 13 11 16 9 19 10 20 
3.0 - 5.0 ha 7 16 7 16 9 19 5 14 
    > 5.0 ha 5 36 5 30 5 26 2 11 
 
Average farm size 1.72 ha 1.54 ha 1.61 ha 1.23 ha 
Gini ratio 0.572a 0.540 0.496 0.458a 
Number of farms (millions) 4.19 5.61 6.42 8.78 
Total farm area (million ha) 7.22a 8.66 10.33 10.32a 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
a. Based on estimated cell averages in the absence of precise data on the distribution of land 
across size cells.  
Notes: 1973, 1983 and 1993 exclude farms smaller than 0.1 hectare in order to conform to the 1963 
definition. The data for these years refer to food producing farms only. 
Sources: Sensus Pertanian 1963: Angka2 Sementara; Sensus Pertanian 1973, Jilid I; Sensus Pertanian 1983, Seri 
B; Sensus Pertanian 1993, Jilid B1 - Indonesia. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Per Capita Household Income by Socio-Economic Groups in Indonesia, 1975-1993 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
  Total average = 100 % Sharesa 
  ────────────────── ────── 
  1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1975 1993 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
A. Agriculture: 
- labourers 51 50 58 51 39 12 10 
- farmers operating less than 0.5 ha 55 65 55 60 61 22 27 
- farmers operating 0.5-1.0 ha 73 75 82 80 74 12 6 
- farmers operating more than 1.0 ha 109 97 133 123 116 14 6 
 sub-total 70 73 76 69 65 60 50 
 
B. Non-agricultural sectors, rural: 
- low socio-economic status 68 97 74 75 66 15 9 
- high socio-economic status 194 163 123 123 144 6 13 
- inactive 89 75 74 109 104 3 2 
 sub-total 102 104 89 104 112 24 23 
 
C. Non-agricultural sectors, urban: 
- low socio-economic status 125 141 131 98 83 9 12 
- high socio-economic status 335 267 213 210 241 6 12 
- inactive 141 117 137 112 103 1 3 
 sub-total 203 171 160 153 154 17 27 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
── 
a. Shares in total population, according to the classification of households. 
Notes: Gross household income is total pre-tax income. Calculation of average income with after-
tax income data yields virtually the same results. The groups with low socio-economic status 
(golongan bawah) include the self-employed, menial clericals, sales and services workers, and manual 
workers. The groups with high socio-economic status (golongan atas) include employers and 
employed elites such as bureaucrats, professionals, managers and the military. The inactive are 
people not in the labour force, such as young students, aged retirees, and the unemployed. 
Source: Calculated from Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 1993. (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 
1996) pp.84-98. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sector Shares in Non-Mining GDP in Indonesia, 1951-2000  
 
Source: Calculated from GDP in current prices from Pendapatan Nasional Indonesia (various years). 
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Figure 2: Historical Comparison of GDP per Capita 
and Income Distribution, UK, Japan and Indonesia 
 
Notes: Not all years for which data are available are labelled in the chart. UK 1949-1984 refers to 
‘CSO hybrid estimates’. Indonesia (wage income) refers to panel A, Table 4.  
Sources: England/UK Lindert, P.H. (2000) ‘Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America’ in 
A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution. (Amsterdam: Elsevier) 
pp.175-177; Japan Mizoguchi, T. and Y. Terasaki (1995) ‘Kakei no Shotoku Bunpu Hendo no 
Keizai - Shakai oyobi Sangyo Kozei-teki’ [Fluctuations in Household Income Distribution as a 
Consequence of Changes in Economic, Social and Industrial Structures], Keizai Kenkyu, 46, pp.59-
77, Mizoguchi, T. (1985) ‘Economic Development and Income Distribution: The Experience of 
East and Southeast Asia’ The Developing Economies, 23, p.310; Indonesia: Table 4, 1976-78 and 1982 
A. Asra (2000) ‘Poverty and Inequality in Indonesia: Estimates, Decomposition and Key Issues’, 
Journal of the Asia-Pacific Economy, 5, p.102, 1980 and 1984 M. Ravallion and M. Huppi (1989) 
‘Measuring Changes in Poverty: A Methodological Case Study of Indonesia during an Adjustment 
Period’, The World Bank Economic Review, 5, pp.57-82, 1990 and 1996 L. Cameron (2000) ‘Poverty 
and Inequality in Java: Examining the Impact of the Changing Age, Educational and Industrial 
Structure’, Journal of Development Economics, 62, p.157; GDP per capita Maddison, A. (1995) Monitoring 
the World Economy 1820-1992. (Paris: OECD) Table D, linked to constant price GDP indices IMF 
International Financial Statistics, UK pre-1820 linked to Maddison, A. (1991) Dynamic Forces in Capitalist 
Development: A Long-Run Comparative View. (Oxford: OUP) Tables A.5 and B.1. 
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